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I. EVIDENCE AND ACCURACY
IT is more than a bit ironic that the decision in Cruzan v. Director,Missouri Department of Health1 hinged on the relationship of eviden-tiary standards and the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The question before the U.S. Supreme Court was whether
Missouri’s Supreme Court had correctly ruled that they could assert a
clear and convincing evidence standard for consequential decisions made
by surrogates on behalf of an incompetent patient.2 The U.S. Supreme
* Joseph J. Fins, M.D., M.A.C.P., F.R.C.P. is the E. William Davis, Jr., M.D. Profes-
sor of Medical Ethics, Professor of Medicine, Professor of Medicine in Psychiatry, Profes-
sor of Medical Ethics in Neurology, Professor of Medical Ethics in Rehabilitation
Medicine, and Professor of Health Care Policy and Research at Weill Cornell Medical
College; co-director of the Consortium for the Advanced Study of Brain Injury (CASBI) at
Weill Cornell Medical College and Rockefeller University in New York, New York; and
the Solomon Center Distinguished Scholar in Medicine, Bioethics, and the Law at Yale
Law School in New Haven, Connecticut.
1. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
2. See id. at 267–69.
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Court affirmed the Missouri court’s decision and asserted that there had
been no violation of the Due Process Clause.3 For the majority, the ques-
tion of evidence related to the quality of knowledge that might allow a
surrogate to make a decision to withdraw life-sustaining therapy.4 In the
absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, treatment
would continue and thus life would be preserved.5
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Black-
mun, also focused on the quality of the evidence. But he took a different
approach. He did not dispute the State’s legitimate interest in protecting
the rights of the incompetent.6 Rather, he argued that care could only be
provided legitimately when it was known to cohere with Nancy Cruzan’s
wishes.7 The goal was not to prolong Ms. Cruzan’s life but to preserve her
liberty.8 To do so, it would be necessary to provide “Nancy Cruzan, now
incompetent, with as accurate as possible a determination of how she
would exercise her rights under these circumstances.”9 If it were deter-
mined that continued treatment was consistent with her prior prefer-
ences, the State could “legitimately assert an interest in providing that
treatment.”10 Short of that knowledge, the goal was to be as accurate as
possible in discerning what her wishes might be.
Justice Brennan continued by asserting that “accuracy, therefore, must
be our touchstone,” maintaining that “until Nancy’s wishes have been de-
termined, the only state interest that may be asserted is an interest in
safeguarding the accuracy of that determination.”11 He argued that by
establishing a clear and convincing evidence standard, Missouri had para-
doxically “fashioned a rule that lessens the likelihood of accurate deter-
minations.”12 Instead of speaking to the specificity of Ms. Cruzan’s
wishes, Missouri’s presumption towards treatment in the absence of
known preferences “skew[ed] the result away from a determination that
as accurately as possible reflect[ed] the individual’s own preferences and
beliefs.”13 Worse than preserving life, that standard was “a rule that
transform[ed] human beings into passive subjects of medical technol-
ogy.”14 Justice Brennan argued that Missouri could neither safeguard pa-
tient choice by misappropriating it nor by depriving surrogates of their
rightful prerogative of making choices on behalf of those closest to them.
Both the majority opinion and the dissents in Cruzan centered on the
importance of evidence related to patient choice. Nonetheless, each side
3. Id. at 286–87.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 303 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
7. Id. at 304.
8. Id. at 315.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 315–16.
12. Id. at 326.
13. Id. at 325.
14. Id.
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saw it differently. For the majority, the absence of evidence led to a de-
fault proposition to treat. For the minority, the moral warrant to treat-
ment was lacking absent prior knowledge of patient wishes.
Justice Stevens summed up the consensus on the importance of the evi-
dence and captured the differing way those facts could inform the law. In
his dissent, Justice Stevens wrote:
My disagreement with the Court is thus unrelated to its endorsement
of the clear and convincing standard of proof for cases of this kind.
Indeed, I agree that the controlling facts must be established with
unmistakable clarity. The critical question, however, is not how to
prove the controlling facts but rather what proven facts should be
controlling.15
But there was another sort of evidence—controlling facts—upon which
the majority and minority agreed. While each side viewed the clear and
convincing standard differently, neither questioned whether Ms. Cruzan
was in the persistent vegetative state.16 While the role of patient prefer-
ences was disputed, Ms. Cruzan’s diagnosis was taken as a certain predi-
cate. Herein lies the irony: in the thirty years since the Cruzan decision,
the diagnostic classification of the vegetative state and other disorders of
consciousness has evolved. Since Cruzan, our nosology has expanded to
include the permanent vegetative state (1994),17 the minimally conscious
state (2002),18 and the chronic vegetative state, which supplanted the per-
manent vegetative state in 2018.19 These refinements in our diagnostic
thinking have brought greater specificity to the assessment of these con-
ditions and with it the reexamination of the clinical presumptions that
went unquestioned in Cruzan.
In this article, I will review how our understanding of the vegetative
state and other disorders of consciousness have developed since Cruzan
and what this new nosology means for patients with severe brain injury
and their families.20 I will trace this refinement of diagnostic classification
15. Id. at 350 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
16. See, e.g., id. at 266 (majority opinion); id. at 302 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
17. Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Persistent Vegetative State
(First of Two Parts), 330 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1500 (1994) [hereinafter Multi-Society
Task Force on PVS, Part I]; Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Medical Aspects of the Per-
sistent Vegetative State (Second of Two Parts), 330 NEW. ENG. J. MED. 1499, 1572–79 (1994)
hereinafter Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Part II].
18. Joseph T. Giacino et al., The Minimally Conscious State: Definition and Diagnostic
Criteria, 58 NEUROLOGY 349, 349 (2002) [hereinafter Giacino et al., The Minimally Con-
scious State].
19. Joseph T. Giacino et al., Practice Guideline Update Recommendations Summary:
Disorders of Consciousness, 91 NEUROLOGY 450, 456 (2018) [hereinafter Giacino et al.,
Practice Guideline Update Recommendations Summary].
20. Much of the historical and clinical background for this evolution is drawn from
Joseph J. Fins, Disorders of Consciousness, Past, Present, and Future, 28 CAMBRIDGE Q.
HEALTHCARE 603, 604 (2019) [hereinafter Fins, Disorders of Consciousness, Past, Present,
and Future]. See also Joseph J. Fins, Disorders of Consciousness in Clinical Practice: Ethi-
cal, Legal and Policy Considerations, in JEROME B. POSNER ET AL., PLUM AND POSNER’S
DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 449–77 (5th ed. 2019) [hereinafter Fins, Disorders of
Consciousness in Clinical Practice]. See generally Joseph T. Giacino et al., Disorders of
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and address the broader normative and legal challenges posed by covert
consciousness in patients with cognitive motor dissociation. I will con-
clude by considering our obligations to patients with disorders of con-
sciousness in the applicability of American disability rights law.
While it is impossible to relitigate Cruzan’s diagnosis thirty years later,
these developments, both scientific and normative, should prompt a re-
flective pause when considering care decisions for patients with disorders
of consciousness. What appeared to be clinically categorical has become,
with time, new clinical insights, and emerging therapeutic interventions, a
more nuanced problem space. The presumptions of futility so associated
with the vegetative state, and more generally severe brain injury, and so
central to the right to die have to some extent been upended by our
emerging knowledge of these brain states. Medicine and the law have to
balance a right to die with a correlative right to care for those who might
yet be helped and whose prior wishes, or those of their surrogates, desire
continued treatment.21 While these developments do not fundamentally
abridge the right to self-determination, they do impose a heightened
clinical, ethical, and juridical responsibility to ascertain the evidentiary
base upon which care decisions will be predicated. To that end, ideology
must give way to emerging evidence about brain injury when considering
the clinical predicate upon which value choices are made.22 Nothing less
will suffice. As Justice Brennan presciently noted, “Accuracy, therefore,
must be our touchstone.”23
II. THE ORIGINS OF THE VEGETATIVE STATE AND THE
SUBSEQUENT CLASSIFICATION OF DISORDERS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
Cruzan forms part of a troika of cases involving women in the vegeta-
tive state that deeply informed how Americans think about death, dying,
and the right to die.24 The 1990 case of Cruzan is bookended both by In
re Quinlan, which was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court in 197625 and
by the national debate over Terri Schiavo in 2005 that mobilized the in-
Consciousness After Acquired Brain Injury: The State of the Science, 10 NATURE REVIEWS
NEUROLOGY 99 (2014).
21. Joseph J. Fins, Affirming the Right to Care, Preserving the Right to Die: Disorders
of Consciousness and Neuroethics After Schiavo, 4 SUPPORTIVE & PALLIATIVE CARE 169,
170 (2006) [hereinafter Fins, Affirming the Right to Care, Preserving the Right to Die].
22. Joseph J. Fins & Fred Plum, Neurological Diagnosis Is More than a State of Mind:
Diagnostic Clarity and Impaired Consciousness, 61 ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 1354, 1355
(2004).
23. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 316 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
24. This section is drawn in part from the author’s previous work, including JOSEPH J.
FINS, A PALLIATIVE ETHIC OF CARE: CLINICAL WISDOM AT LIFE’S END (2005); JOSEPH J.
FINS, RIGHTS COME TO MIND: BRAIN INJURY, ETHICS AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CON-
SCIOUSNESS (2015) [hereinafter FINS, RIGHTS COME TO MIND]; Fins, Disorders of Con-
sciousness, Past, Present, and Future, supra note 20; Fins, Disorders of Consciousness in
Clinical Practice, supra note 20.
25. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 647 (N.J. 1976).
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tercessions of Congress and President George W. Bush.26 In the aggre-
gate, these three cases helped to advance a right to die in American
jurisprudence.
Collectively these cases helped to enfranchise surrogates to make deci-
sions on behalf of incapacitated patients. Indeed, it has been argued that
the origins of the Patient Self-Determination Act (PSDA), which stipu-
lated that all states have a mechanism for advance care planning, and the
need for individuals to express their end-of-life preferences in advance of
decisional incapacity originated from Justice O’Connor’s opinion in
Cruzan.27 Her Cruzan opinion inspired Senators Danforth and Moynihan
to write the Patient Self-Determination Act,28 which has since been en-
sconced in clinical practice as a means for patients to engage in advance
care planning. These developments in law and practice point to the cen-
trality of Cruzan, and her sister cases, in the evolution of end-of-life care
in the United States and the centrality of the vegetative state to this
process.29
At the core of this evolution were perceptions about the futility of the
vegetative state.30 This view had its origins in Quinlan, a case also involv-
ing a young woman, Karen Ann Quinlan, in the vegetative state.31 Chief
Judge Hughes of the New Jersey Supreme Court asked Fred Plum, the
co-originator of the persistent vegetative state, to provide expert testi-
mony and confirm Ms. Quinlan’s diagnosis. Plum examined Ms. Quinlan
and his testimony formed a key component of Chief Judge Hughes’s deci-
sion to allow for the removal of Ms. Quinlan’s ventilator.32 He wrote,
[I]t was indicated by Dr. Plum that the brain works in essentially two
ways, the vegetative and the sapient. . . .
. . .
We have no hesitancy in deciding . . . that no external compelling
interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable,
only to vegetate a few more measurable months with no realistic pos-
sibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life.33
The justification for the withdrawal of life-sustaining therapy hinges on
this loss of higher cognitive function with the implication that personhood
had also been irretrievably lost. This was the ultimate in medical futility
and shaped perceptions for decades. And it still does for patients with
severe brain injury. A recent study from Canada reported that 70.2% of
26. Fins, Affirming the Right to Care, Preserving the Right to Die, supra note 21, at 170.
27. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 287–92 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
28. See Elizabeth L. McCloskey, The Patient Self-Determination Act, 1 KENNEDY INST.
ETHICS J. 163, 166 (1991).
29. See generally A PALLIATIVE ETHIC OF CARE: CLINICAL WISDOM AT LIFE’S END,
supra note 24.
30. Joseph J. Fins, Constructing an Ethical Stereotaxy for Severe Brain Injury: Balanc-
ing Risks, Benefits and Access, 4 NATURE REVIEWS NEUROSCIENCE 323, 323 (2003).
31. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J. 1976).
32. Id. at 654–55.
33. Id. at 654, 653.
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deaths during an acute hospitalization for severe brain injury were attrib-
utable to a decision to withdraw life-sustaining therapy.34
The vegetative state was not a brain state amenable to repair or resto-
ration, and these perceptions shaped physician attitudes and grounded a
right to die in the futility of the vegetative state. While the right to die has
expanded beyond those in the vegetative state, it had its start there.35
Brain injuries of such gravity were immutable and attempts to sustain—
much less treat—patients in the vegetative state were ethically dispropor-
tionate because nothing could be done to help. Ms. Quinlan’s autopsy
published in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1994 only sustained
this perception.36 The findings indicated her brain weighed 835 grams,
which is just over half the weight of a normal brain; had a thinning cortex;
and had hydrocephalus ex vacuo, meaning massively enlarged ventri-
cles.37 This was not a brain that would seemingly sustain higher integra-
tive function or have prospects for recovery.
While a low chance of recovery was certainly true in Ms. Quinlan’s
case, we have come to understand in the decades since Quinlan that pa-
tients who appear clinically identical to Ms. Quinlan may in fact have
been a heterogeneous group with different neurocircuitry and a greater
capacity for recovery. These are biological distinctions with clinical, nor-
mative, and legal implications that are worthy of additional parsing.
To fully understand these critical distinctions, we need to trace our
evolving knowledge of disorders of consciousness and begin with a con-
sideration of the vegetative state—what it is and how it came to be. Eigh-
teen years before Cruzan was decided, Bryan Jennett and Fred Plum
described the persistent vegetative state. In a landmark article in the Lan-
cet in 1972, they described a state of wakeful unresponsiveness in which
the eyes were open but there was no awareness of self, others, or the
environment.38 They sought to designate what they described as a “syn-
drome without a name.”39 Their efforts had an outsized reach because of
their respective standing in medicine. Jennett was a distinguished Scottish
neurosurgeon who had previously described the Glasgow Coma and Out-
come Scales.40 Plum, who was my teacher and later colleague at Cornell,
was a preeminent American neurologist who had described the Locked-
34. Alexis F. Turgeon et al., Mortality Associated with Withdrawal of Life-Sustaining
Therapy for Patients with Severe Traumatic Brain Injury: A Canadian Multicentre Cohort
Study, 183 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1581, 1581 (2011).
35. See Fins & Plum, supra note 22, at 1354–55.
36. See Hannah C. Kinney et al., Neuropathological Findings in the Brain of Karen
Ann Quinlan: The Role of the Thalamus in the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 1469, 1472–74 (1994).
37. Id. at 1470.
38. Bryan Jennett & Fred Plum, Persistent Vegetative State After Brain Damage: A
Syndrome in Search of a Name, 299 LANCET 646, 734–35 (1972).
39. Id. at 735–37.
40. Geoff Watts, Obituary: Bryan Jennett, 371 LANCET 646, 646 (2008).
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in-State in 1966 (with his colleague Jerome B. Posner)41 and had begun to
characterize disorders of consciousness in his scientific and clinical
work.42
From the start, the vegetative state has been paradoxical. First, the
physiology and appearance of these patients at the bedside has prompted
confusion and, in some quarters, contention. Paradoxically, they appear
to be awake and seem to have recovered from coma, which is an eyes
closed state of unresponsiveness. On closer examination, however, their
eyes are open but unknowing, which is disappointing to expectant loved
ones. The eyes, which are thought to be the windows to the soul, are open
but unresponsive and unaware. Families are devastated when they realize
that a sign they took to be emblematic of the return of consciousness was
in fact simply the recovery of the brain stem leading to what Jennett and
Plum so elegantly described as a state of wakeful unresponsiveness.43
Only reflexive functions which derive from the recovery of the brain stem
are intact.44 Higher integrative functions involving the cortex are not pre-
sent.45 Only the vegetative functions exist, hence the framework offered
by Chief Judge Hughes in Quinlan.
The term “vegetative,” which seems pejorative to the unschooled, actu-
ally derives from Aristotle’s De Anima and the hierarchical brain func-
tion cited in that decision.46 Aristotle, the botanist and taxonomist,
distinguished the nutritive or vegetative faculties from the higher
(animalic) ones that produce sensation and cognition.47 Plum was aware
of the conception of a vegetative nervous system and appropriated it to
hierarchically distinguish the autonomic functions subsumed by the brain
stem from the cognitive and sapient functions of the cerebral cortex.48
The vegetative state when first described by Jennett and Plum also had
a temporal component, hence the modifier “persistent.” In their Lancet
article, they explained why they chose the term “persistent” against other
alternatives.49 They wanted to convey a high likelihood of long duration
but, at that juncture, felt uncomfortable asserting that the state was per-
manent.50 The data was not there for them to sustain that argument so
41. See FRED PLUM & JEROME B. POSNER, DIAGNOSIS OF STUPOR AND COMA 93 (1st
ed. 1966).
42. See Joseph J. Fins, A Once and Future Clinical Neuroethics: A History of What Was
and What Might Be, 30 J. CLINICAL ETHICS 27, 27–34 (2019); see also Lawrence K. Altman,
Fred Plum, Neurologist Who Helped Coin ‘Persistent Vegetative State,’ Dies at 86, N.Y.
TIMES (June 12, 2008), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/13/health/13plum.html [https://
perma.cc/WH49-CU5V].
43. Jennett & Plum, supra note 38, at 734–35.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. ARISTOTLE, DE ANIMA (R.D. Hicks trans., 1907); see also Zoe M. Adams & Jo-
seph J. Fins, The Historical Origins of the Vegetative State: Received Wisdom and the Utility
of the Text, 265 J. HIST. NEUROSCIENCES 140, 144–49 (2017).
47. ARISTOTLE, supra note 46, at 412a22–415b5.
48. Fred Plum et al., Coordinated Expression in Chronically Unconscious Persons, 353
PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y 1929, 1929–30, 1932–33 (1998).
49. Jennett & Plum, supra note 38, at 736–37.
50. Id.
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they settled on “persistent” to convey the likely duration of this brain
state and to leave open the possibility that there might be additional re-
covery over time.51 Their explanation is worth noting for its nosological
humility and unwillingness to go beyond the available data. They ob-
served: “Certainly we are concerned to identify an irrevocable state, al-
though the criteria needed to establish that prediction reliably have still
to be confirmed. Until then ‘persistent’ is safer than ‘permanent’ or ‘irre-
versible’; but prolonged is not strong enough, and unless it is quantified it
is meaningless.”52
As the foregoing indicates, Jennett and Plum were exceedingly cau-
tious about the claims they could make. This was also the case for what
was observed at the bedside during the clinical examination. In an aside
that seems remarkably prescient to me, they comment on the persistent
vegetative state, noting that “it seems that there is wakefulness without
awareness.”53 They carefully hedged their bets because, without the abil-
ity to peer inside the injured brain, they could not know for sure. So, they
carefully suggested that their state of wakeful unresponsive was based on
what was observed, and it seemed that this reality cohered with the pa-
tient’s inner state. Their recognition of the limits of bedside evaluation
would prove prescient given the subsequent identification of covert con-
sciousness utilizing functional neuroimaging.
Before that technology developed, the vegetative state underwent sub-
sequent refinement. Four years after Cruzan was decided, the Multi-Soci-
ety Task Force (MSTF) further classified the vegetative state as persistent
and permanent. In a two-part report published in the New England Jour-
nal of Medicine in 1994, the vegetative state was reclassified as persistent
if it lasted for one month and as permanent either three months after
anoxic brain injury or twelve months after traumatic brain injury.54
The 1994 MSTF framework soon began to prove problematic as it was
becoming clear that some patients were violating these temporal markers
and recovering consciousness after entering into the permanent vegeta-
tive state. These patients, who appeared vegetative but were in a liminal
state of consciousness, were subsequently described as being in the mini-
mally conscious state (MCS), a category codified in 2002.55 MCS patients
had the capacity for intention, attention, or memory and interacted with
their environment unlike the wakeful, unresponsive vegetative patient.56
They may look up when someone came into the room, respond to their
name, or reach for a cup but did so unreliably and inconsistently. When
51. See id. at 735.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 734.
54. See Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Part II, supra note 17, at 1575.
55. See, e.g., Joseph T. Giacino & Kathleen Kalmar, The Vegetative and Minimally
Conscious States: A Comparison of Clinical Features and Functional Outcome, 12 J. HEAD
TRAUMA & REHABILITATION 36, 37 (1997).
56. Caroline Schnakers et al., Diagnostic Accuracy of the Vegetative and Minimally
Conscious State: Clinical Consensus Versus Standardized Neurobehavioral Assessment, 9
BMC NEUROLOGY 35, 37 (2009).
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they were not responding, they were often mistaken for being in the vege-
tative state. Caroline Schnakers and her colleagues found that 41% of
traumatic brain injury patients in chronic care that were thought to be
vegetative were in fact in the MCS with the Coma Recovery Scale-Re-
vised, a behavioral assessment tool.57
Functional neuroimaging revealed that MCS patients, who were often
mistaken for being vegetative, were in fact biologically distinct. Unlike
vegetative patients who did not have intact neural networks,58 those in
MCS had widely distributed neural networks capable of the integrative
function necessary to sustain consciousness or to perceive pain.59 Func-
tional imaging also revealed the possibility of awareness in patients who
appear to be in the vegetative state. In a seminal paper published in 2006,
Adrian Owen and his colleagues reported “awareness” in a patient who
was behaviorally in the vegetative state based on clinical examination.60
This patient was able to demonstrate volitional responses on neuroimag-
ing and activate anatomic regions of interest when asked to perform mo-
tor, spatial, and linguistic tasks, such as imagining playing tennis or
walking around a house, and distinguishing similarly sounding words with
differing meanings.61
This was a highly significant finding because it showed the potential for
covert consciousness, namely a discordance between what was observed
at the bedside and what might actually be going on inside a patient’s
head.62 This possibility, realized thirty-four years after Jennett and Plum
wrote their Lancet article, prompted Jennet and Plum to note that the
vegetative state seems to be one of wakeful unresponsiveness.63 In 1972,
they did not have the technological means to definitively know that what
was observed at the bedside was always an accurate representation of the
brain’s inner state.
Jennett and Plum’s editorial caution was more prescient than they
might have even appreciated at the time. The possibility of covert con-
sciousness—or cognitive motor dissociation (CMD), as my colleague
Nicholas Schiff has described it64—represents a class of patients who are
capable of volitional responses on fMRI but unable to respond motori-
cally. The utilization of functional imaging65 and electrophysiologic mea-
57. Id. at 36.
58. Steven Laureys et al., Cortical Processing of Noxious Somatosensory Stimuli in the
Persistent Vegetative State, 17 NEUROIMAGE 732, 734–35 (2002).
59. Nicholas D. Schiff et al., fMRI Reveals Large-Scale Network Activation in Mini-
mally Conscious Patients, 64 NEUROLOGY 514, 522 (2005).
60. Adrian M. Owen et al., Detecting Awareness in the Vegetative State, 313 SCIENCE
1402, 1402 (2006).
61. Id.
62. See Joseph J. Fins & Nicholas D. Schiff, Shades of Gray: New Insights into the
Vegetative State, 36 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 8, 8 (2006).
63. See Jennett & Plum, supra note 38.
64. See Nicholas D. Schiff, Cognitive Motor Dissociation Following Severe Brain Inju-
ries, 72 JAMA NEUROLOGY 1413, 1415 (2015).
65. Brian L. Edlow et al., Early Detection of Consciousness in Patients with Acute Se-
vere Traumatic Brain Injury, 140 BRAIN 2399, 2400 (2017).
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sures66 can help these patients who may be in chronic care or, as has been
more recently shown, still hospitalized in intensive care. Notably, patients
who are found to have covert consciousness have a more favorable one-
year outcome than those who do not have covert consciousness.67 In the
aggregate, this data has significant, clinical, normative, and legal implica-
tions for patient care.68
Although we should expect the continued evolution of medicine’s clas-
sification of disorders of consciousness, an important milestone was
reached in 2018 when the American Academy of Neurology (AAN), the
American College of Rehabilitation Medicine (ACRM), and the National
Institute on Disability, Independent Living, and Rehabilitation Research
(NIDILRR) published both a systematic, evidence-based review69 and a
new practice guideline70 pertaining to these patients. These papers, along
with a commentary on ethical palliative and legal considerations which I
was privileged to write with my co-author James L. Bernat,71 were simul-
taneously published in Neurology and the Archives of Physical Medicine
and Rehabilitation. These papers called for better assessment and care for
patients with disorders of consciousness and a reversal of the presump-
tion of futility that has undermined the care of this population.72 From a
nosological point of view, this body of work supplants the 1994 MSTF
report on the vegetative state73 and affirmed the prior MCS Aspen
Neurobehavioral Conference Workgroup criteria.74 Importantly, it called
66. See, e.g., Jan Claassen et al., Detection of Brain Activation in Unresponsive Patients
with Acute Brain Injury, 380 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2497, 2498–99 (2019).
67. Id. at 2501–02.
68. See Brian L. Edlow & Joseph J. Fins, Assessment of Covert Consciousness in the
Intensive Care Unit: Clinical and Ethical Considerations, 33 J. HEAD TRAUMA & REHABILI-
TATION 424 (2018). An additional word on nomenclature is noted with respect to the vege-
tative state. Recently in Europe, neurologists have been referring to the vegetative state as
Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome (UWS), in part because of the view that the vegeta-
tive state is pejorative. See Steven Laureys et al., Unresponsive Wakefulness Syndrome: A
New Name for the Vegetative State or Apallic Syndrome, 8 BMC MED. 68, 68–69 (2010).
The renaming of the vegetative state is problematic on several counts. First, and most sig-
nificantly, is the adoption of a behavioral description in light of covert consciousness as
discerned by neuroimaging described previously. Second is the incomplete and inaccurate
appropriation of the term itself. Jennett and Plum, when describing the vegetative state,
observed that “it seems that there is wakefulness without awareness” and, thus, should lay
claim to authorial provenance. See Jennett & Plum, supra note 38, at 734. And beyond that
is their careful insertion of “seems,” which spoke to the limits of bedside assessment, a
concern vindicated by the detection of covert consciousness and cognitive motor dissocia-
tion. Id. Third, is the failure to appreciate the etymologic origins of the vegetative state
dating back to Aristotle as described above. See Adams & Fins, supra note 46, at 140–53.
69. Joseph T. Giacino et al., Comprehensive Systematic Review Update Summary: Dis-
orders of Consciousness, 91 NEUROLOGY 461 (2018) [hereinafter Giacino et al., Compre-
hensive Systematic Review Update Summary].
70. Giacino et al., Practice Guideline Update Recommendations Summary, supra note
19.
71. Joseph J. Fins & James L. Bernat, Ethical, Palliative, and Policy Considerations in
Disorders of Consciousness, 91 NEUROLOGY 471 (2018).
72. See, e.g., FINS, RIGHTS COME TO MIND, supra note 24, at 309–11.
73. Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Part I, supra note 17; Multi-Society Task Force
on PVS, Part II, supra note 17.
74. Giacino et al., The Minimally Conscious State, supra note 18.
2020] Cruzan and the Other Evidentiary Standard 101
for the re-designation of the permanent vegetative state as chronic, as a
review of the available data suggested that 20% of patients thought to be
in the permanent vegetative state could recover to a higher level of
function.75
This is a striking number—and open to ideological hyperbole—given
the place that the perceived permanence of the vegetative state has
played in law and medicine. With Bernat, I sought to temper this number
and explain who these patients were.76 First, it is critical to note that for
80% of patients the vegetative state remains permanent after the prior
milestones were reached following anoxic or traumatic injury.77 Second,
for the 20% of patients with the possibility of additional recovery, it is
equally necessary to stratify the sample.78 Bernat and I noted that nearly
half of these patients were likely to have been in the MCS all along but
were misdiagnosed, given the 41% error rate noted by Schnakers.79
These patients would have been found to have been in MCS by behav-
ioral assessment using the Coma Recovery Scale-Revised. Some patients
might have had intact neural networks that were dormant until activated
by neuromodulation using pharmacologic agents such as Amantadine,
which has been shown to accelerate the recovery of consciousness in a
randomized clinical trial,80 or Zolpidem, which has been shown in case
reports to cause changes in brain state, activating dormant neural net-
works resulting in the return of consciousness.81
Alternately, a state change could have been prompted by electrical,
magnetic, or sonic neuromodulation, such as investigational approaches
utilizing deep brain stimulation,82 transcranial magnetic stimulation,83
and directed ultrasound.84 Stimulated, these patients might have been
able to manifest a behavioral response at the bedside or on neuroimag-
ing, placing them in the CMD category. A smaller fraction might have
had late structural changes85 and been unassessed, again having the po-
tential to manifest responses behaviorally if tasked or on neuroimaging.
75. See Fins & Bernat, supra note 71, at 472.
76. See id. at 472–73.
77. Id. at 472.
78. See id.
79. See Schnakers et al., supra note 56, at 37.
80. Joseph T. Giacino et al., Placebo-Controlled Trial of Amantadine for Severe Trau-
matic Brain Injury, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 819, 823–24 (2012).
81. Christine Brefel-Courbon et al., Clinical and Imaging Evidence of Zolpidem Effect
in Hypoxic Encephalopathy, 62 ANNALS NEUROLOGY 102, 103 (2007).
82. Nicholas D. Schiff et al., Behavioral Improvements with Thalamic Stimulation After
Severe Traumatic Brain Injury, 448 NATURE 600, 600–02 (2007).
83. Aldo Ragazzoni et al., Clinical Neurophysiology of Prolonged Disorders of Con-
sciousness: From Diagnostic Stimulation to Therapeutic Neuromodulation, 128 CLINICAL
NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1629, 1634–35 (2017).
84. Martin M. Monti et al., Letter to the Editor, Non-Invasive Ultrasonic Thalamic
Stimulation in Disorders of Consciousness After Severe Brain Injury: A First-in-Man Re-
port, 9 BRAIN STIMULATION 940, 940–41 (2016).
85. Daniel J. Thengone et al., Local Changes in Network Structure Contribute to Late
Communication After Severe Brain Injury, SCI. TRANSLATIONAL MED., Dec. 7, 2016, at 1,
8.
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The point of elaborating on the 20% is to note that most patients were
either already in MCS (and unidentified), under-stimulated, or in CMD.
Only a small fraction would have had the structural changes that most lay
readers would associate with late recovery. This clarification is necessary
to temper expectations of miracle cures and also stress the permanence of
unconsciousness for the 80% of patients in the newly designated chronic
vegetative state.
III. THE NEW NOSOLOGY: REREADING CRUZAN IN THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
With these developments in mind, let us turn to Ms. Cruzan and her
diagnosis. We now know that under prevailing nosologic schema she
would no longer be categorized as being in the persistent vegetative state.
Her accident was in 1983, the case went to the Supreme Court of Mis-
souri in 1988, and then her case went to the U.S. Supreme Court in
1990.86 By 1994, she would have been characterized as in the permanent
vegetative state given the framework offered by the MSTF; that is, until
2018 when she would have been redesignated as in the chronic vegetative
state according to the new criteria promulgated by AAN, ACRM, and
NIDILRR. Such is the evolving nosology of classification.
But of course, these re-designations presume the evidentiary predicate
agreed to by both the Supreme Court of Missouri and the U.S. Supreme
Court, namely that Ms. Cruzan was in the vegetative state.87 Given the
evolution of these diagnostic categories and new scientific understanding
of disorders of consciousness, it is only natural—indeed tempting—to ask
the provocative question of whether her diagnosis was correct. That is,
Was she in the vegetative state or perhaps the MCS?
There is a precedent for asking this sort of question about whether a
patient could be in a borderline brain state. Plum once recounted to me
that in order to assess the lower limit Ms. Quinlan’s diagnosis he had
taken her off the ventilator as part of his examination, as the court-ap-
pointed neurologist tasked to confirm her diagnosis in the persistent veg-
etative state.88 I was shocked that he took this upon himself, as the case
itself was about the removal of Ms. Quinlan’s ventilator. But, of course,
Plum, in his sanctioned diagnostic role, had to disconnect the patient
from the ventilator to see if she had an intact brain stem that could drive
respiratory effort. If she did not breathe on her own as he performed this
apnea test, her diagnosis would have been brain death. But she did
breathe; thus, she had an intact brain stem consistent with the diagnosis
86. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408 (Mo. 1988) (en banc), aff’d sub nom., 497 U.S.
261 (1990).
87. See Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 266; Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
88. See generally In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 654–55 (N.J. 1976).
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of the vegetative state. As is well appreciated, she lived for many years,
breathing on her own.89
With this precedent in mind, let us engage in the post hoc thought ex-
periment and consider the upper limits of Ms. Cruzan’s diagnosis. Let us
begin with the clinical history. In Cruzan v. Harmon,90 we read the initial
details of Ms. Cruzan’s injury. We learn that Ms. Cruzan was in a car
accident.91 A state trooper arrived six minutes later to find Ms. Cruzan
face down in a ditch not breathing.92 Paramedics arrived nine minutes
later and restored cardiac and respiratory function in another three min-
utes.93 An initial head CT scan did not show any brain abnormalities.94 It
was estimated that Ms. Cruzan had been anoxic for twelve to fourteen
minutes, more than enough time to cause “permanent brain damage.”95
This suggests that she had a mix of traumatic and anoxic brain injury,
with the latter likely being more determinative given its potential to in-
flict global harm on the brain.
This initial description is confounding as it presumes that Ms. Cruzan
had only been apneic (not breathing) since the arrival of the initial emer-
gency responder. More than likely, she had been partially or completely
deprived of oxygen to some degree longer than that, as she was found
both apneic and asystolic. The other incongruity is the normal CT scan
done upon admission. There was neither evidence of diffuse axonal injury
seen with anoxic injury nor any evidence of traumatic brain injury al-
though she had been in a car accident and was said by the attending phy-
sician to have sustained a contusion. While there was no evidence of
either anoxia or contusion on the scan, it is important to appreciate that
these findings can manifest themselves on subsequent CT scan studies.
Later CT scans—as reported in Cruzan—showed large ventricles and
thinning of the cortex, consistent with grave injury, and “massive enlarge-
ment of the ventricles filling with cerebrospinal fluid in the area where
the brain has degenerated,” as well as “cortical atrophy [which was] irre-
versible, permanent, progressive and ongoing.”96
Ms. Cruzan remained in a coma for three weeks,97 which may be
slightly longer than the norm, but she may have been sedated or have had
confounding reasons to remain in that unresponsive, eyes-closed state.
But then there is a striking and troubling comment in the record from
Cruzan: “Thereafter, she seemed to improve somewhat and was able to
89. See FINS, RIGHTS COME TO MIND, supra note 24, at 40; see also Joseph J. Fins,
Lessons from the Injured Brain: A Bioethicist in the Vineyards of Neuroscience, 18 CAM-
BRIDGE Q. HEALTH CARE ETHICS 7, 8 (2009).
90. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d 408.
91. Id. at 410–11.




96. Id. at 410–11.
97. Id. at 411.
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take nutrition orally.”98 A feeding tube was placed subsequently “to as-
sist her recovery.”99 Nonetheless, “valiant efforts” were made to rehabili-
tate her “without success.”100
What to make of this report of her ability to take nutrition orally? If it
were a purposeful action, it would belie the diagnosis of the vegetative
state. Should that make us wonder if she were minimally conscious? Jen-
nett, in his monograph on the vegetative state, notes that the MSTF “con-
cluded that most patients preserve the swallowing reflex but that
coordination is impaired.”101 While there is some dispute about whether
the ability to take oral feeding precludes the vegetative diagnosis, Jennett
believed that whether or not these patients needed artificial nutrition and
hydration was not diagnostically dispositive but “a matter of practicality
rather than of pathophysiology.”102
William H. Colby, the attorney for the Cruzans, recounts in his mem-
oir, Long Goodbye: The Deaths of Nancy Cruzan, the testimony of Ron-
ald C. Cranford, a neurologist and witness for the plaintiffs.103 Cranford,
a distinguished neurologist from the University of Minnesota and expert
in the vegetative state, had spent considerable time examining Ms.
Cruzan.104 In his testimony to the trial court, Cranford explained that the
mere ability to swallow is not purposeful but rather reflexive.105 Colby
summarized Cranford’s testimony on this point: “Placing food carefully in
the back of the mouth to activate a brain stem mediated swallowing re-
flex is not eating.”106
And what of her apparent response to pain and sound? Does that
make the case for the MCS and not the persistent vegetative state? As
reported in Cruzan, “[H]er highest cognitive brain function is exhibited
by her grimacing perhaps in recognition of ordinarily painful stimuli, indi-
cating the experience of pain and apparent response to sound.”107
Pain is described in contradictory ways by the Justices in Cruzan and
seems to be a topic of confusion and an object of psychological projec-
tion. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, making a distinction be-
tween withdrawing life support and suicide, asserted, “Petitioners rely on
[the following] distinction[ ] to separate Nancy Cruzan’s case from ordi-




101. BRYAN JENNETT, THE VEGETATIVE STATE: MEDICAL FACTS, ETHICAL AND LE-
GAL DILEMMAS 18 (2002) (referencing Multi-Society Task Force on PVS, Part I, supra note
17, at 1499–508).
102. Id.
103. See WILLIAM H. COLBY, LONG GOODBYE: THE DEATHS OF NANCY CRUZAN
129–55 (2002).
104. See id. at 130–32.
105. See id. at 131–32.
106. Id. at 133.
107. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 411 (Mo. 1988) (en banc).
108. Cruzan v. Dir., Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 296 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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contention about the petitioners which, in my view, is not supported by
the record. Justice Stevens, in his dissenting opinion, cited Judge Black-
mar from Missouri and stated that “[t]here is evidence that Nancy may
react to pain stimuli.”109 Judge Blackmar also added the prospect of
psychic suffering: “If she has any awareness of her surroundings, her life
must be a living hell.”110 When we read of such inferences—or Justice
Brennan’s dissent, in which he observed that being in “[s]uch conditions
are, for many, humiliating to contemplate, as is visiting a prolonged and
anguished vigil on one’s parents, spouse and children”111—one must ask
whose pain and suffering is the object of concern? Is it the patient or
those who are pressed into that vigil?
This tendency to conflate the patient’s potential for pain and suffering
with those of their intimates was a feature of Chief Judge Hughes’s deci-
sion in Quinlan. Note the wording of his decision allowing the removal of
Ms. Quinlan’s ventilator:
It was indicated by Dr. Plum that the brain works in essentially two
ways, the vegetative and the sapient. . . .
. . .
We have no hesitancy in deciding . . . that no external compelling
interest of the State could compel Karen to endure the unendurable,
only to vegetate a few more measurable months with no realistic pos-
sibility of returning to any semblance of cognitive or sapient life.112
Citing the testimony of Plum and correctly distinguishing the autonomic
or vegetative functions of the brain from the cognitive and sapient ones,
Chief Judge Hughes nonetheless wrote that the State was compelling
“Karen to endure the unendurable.”113 There is illogic in this passage. If a
patient is vegetative, they are not enduring anything. They are unaware of
self, others, and the environment. Chief Judge Hughes clearly appreciates
this but, nonetheless, writes of compelling Ms. Cruzan “to endure the
unendurable.”114 More likely than not, as suggested by Justice Brennan’s
comments about “anguished vigil,”115 Chief Judge Hughes is referring to
the distress inflicted upon the Quinlans who would be forced to watch
their daughter in the vegetative state. The pain and suffering is neither
Ms. Quinlan’s nor Ms. Cruzan’s; rather, it is the pain and suffering of
their families.
Returning to Judge Blackmar’s conclusion, quoted by Justice Brennan,
we see echoes of this very language. Judge Blackmar in his dissent wrote,
“The principal opinion attempts to establish absolutes, but does so at the
expense of human factors. In so doing it unnecessarily subjects Nancy and
109. Id. at 332 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 429 (Blackmar,
J., dissenting)).
110. Id. at 337 (quoting Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 429 (Blackmar, J., dissenting)).
111. Id. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
112. In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 654, 663 (N.J. 1976).
113. Id. at 663.
114. Id. at 661.
115. Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 311 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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those close to her to continuous torture which no family should be forced
to endure.”116 Here, it seems clear that Judge Blackmar believed that the
Cruzan family was being tortured by having to bear witness to—that is,
“endure”—continued life-sustaining measures they felt were unjustly in-
flicted upon their daughter. But the text of Judge Blackmar’s dissent re-
mains ambiguous because he maintained that the continued treatment
mandated by the majority “subjects Nancy,” as well as her family mem-
bers, to “continuous torture.”117 Like Chief Judge Hughes’s opinion, the
inference in Judge Blackmar’s dissent is clear about who is actually being
tortured. Nonetheless, the language of the text is challenging if one wants
to assert some degree of higher cognitive function to vegetative patients.
I point to these ambiguities regarding pain because they cloud the pic-
ture about the vegetative patient’s ability to perceive pain and experience
suffering. For our purposes of confirming the diagnosis, it is essential to
determine whether Ms. Cruzan’s seeming expressions of pain or distress
are in any way dispositive of awareness. Specifically, the question is, Was
her grimacing purposeful or reflexive? Was it autonomic or intentional?
Simply examining the language, we note the insertion of “perhaps”
before the description of the perception.118 The possibility of a percep-
tion versus a reflex is suggested by the “experience of pain,”119 which
could imply cognizance or understanding. The language is highly ambigu-
ous, descriptive without regard, and more confounding than it would first
appear.
To return to Jennett’s treatise on the vegetative state, he writes, “Most
patients show some response to painful stimuli. A stimulated limb may
withdraw or there may be a generalized movement of all four
limbs . . . .”120 He continues, with special relevance to our question re-
garding Ms. Cruzan, noting that the aforementioned movements are
“sometimes accompanied by facial grimacing and perhaps a groan.”121
He concludes by explaining that “[i]t is generally held that these re-
sponses are all at reflex level and do not indicate that pain is being exper-
ienced at a conscious level.”122 Cranford testified to the same. According
to Colby’s account of Cranford’s testimony:
Dr. Cranford dispassionately explained the exam of the day before
to Judge Teel. To Cranford, the medical reality was clear: A grimace
is a reflex, which in healthy people we automatically associate with
116. Cruzan v. Harmon, 760 S.W.2d 408, 429–30 (Mo. 1988) (en banc) (Blackmar, J.,
dissenting).
117. Id.
118. See, e.g., id. at 411 (majority opinion) (noting that the trial court found that Ms.
Cruzan was “oblivious to her environment except for reflexive responses to sound and
perhaps painful stimuli; . . . [and] her highest cognitive brain function is exhibited by her
grimacing perhaps in recognition of ordinarily painful stimuli, indicating the experience of
pain and apparent response to sound”).
119. See id.
120. JENNETT, supra note 101, at 15.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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pain. Nancy’s grimaces could never have connection to pain as we
understand it, because the part of her brain that could perceive, un-
derstand, and feel pain was simply gone.123
Similarly, Ms. Cruzan’s “apparent response to sound”124 is consistent
with the vegetative state and not necessarily indicative of awareness of
her environment. Jennett explains, “It seems clear that cortical integrity is
not required for sudden light or sound to stimulate a brief orienting reflex
with the eyes blinking and the head and eyes turning briefly towards a
strong auditory or visual stimulus.”125 Colby reports that Cranford’s
“conclusion was that Nancy was in a classic persistent vegetative state.”126
From our vantage point, thirty years hence, one must agree with
Cranford’s conclusion. He was a skilled neurologist who carefully ex-
amined the patient. He was well versed in the literature surrounding the
vegetative state and highly respected as a clinician and as an academic
neurologist. As an author of the MSTF, he had vast experience assessing
such patients. In Cranford’s obituary in the Lancet, Eelco Wijdicks of the
Mayo Clinic asserted that Cranford “had seen more patients in persistent
vegetative state than anyone else.”127 Wijdicks noted Cranford’s “clinical
acumen,” stating that Cranford “was without any question one of the
world’s experts in persistent vegetative state.”128
IV. BEYOND CRUZAN: CURRENT DIAGNOSTIC AND
THERAPEUTIC CHALLENGES
Having acknowledged Cranford’s expertise and a fact pattern consis-
tent with the vegetative diagnosis for Ms. Cruzan, it is equally important
to appreciate subsequent developments that might inform the assessment
of future patients thought to be in the vegetative state. Ms. Cruzan was
evaluated without a behavioral metric tool called the Coma Recovery
Scale-Revised, which was designed to assess disorders of consciousness
and has been found to be superior to the Glasgow Coma and Outcome
Scales.129 This assessment tool has been revalidated by the AAN, ACRM,
and NIDILRR’s evidence-based review130 and endorsed by its practice
guideline.131 Less validated and still investigative methods of assessment
include neuroimaging and electrophysiologic testing. The value of these
methods is their ability to assess covert consciousness.132
123. COLBY, supra note 103, at 132.
124. Cruzan, 760 S.W.2d at 411.
125. JENNETT, supra note 101, at 11.
126. COLBY, supra note 103, at 132.
127. Ivan Oransky, Obituary: Ronald E. Cranford, 368 LANCET 112, 112 (2006).
128. Id.
129. See Schnakers et al., supra note 56, at 37.
130. See Giacino et al., Comprehensive Systematic Review Update Summary, supra note
69.
131. See Giacino et al., Practice Guideline Update Recommendations Summary, supra
note 19.
132. See generally Claassen et al., supra note 66; Edlow et al., supra note 65.
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While not routinely used in clinical practice, neuroimaging and elec-
trophysiologic testing can help in ambiguous clinical circumstances and
avoid a type-II error; that is, missing consciousness when it is indeed pre-
sent.133 The challenge that remains is that these methods are not ready
for routine clinical practice because the test characteristics of these as-
sessment tools have not been adequately described. Indeed, some of the
data thus far is paradoxical. For example, some patients who are able to
follow behavioral commands are unable to do the same tasks in the scan-
ner. Moreover, while positive activations may be dispositive of covert
consciousness, conclusions cannot be drawn from a negative test.134 A
failure to respond may mean the patient is unconscious. However, the
determination may depend on the scientific methodology; the nature of
the question or task; the patient’s ability, level of arousal, attention span,
and ability to attend to the question; or the latency of the patient’s re-
sponse. In one circumstance, a subject’s response on the scanner was so
delayed that it was buried in the data of the following question, con-
founding the analysis.135 Another reason that a patient may fail to re-
spond is because the patient has a sensory disorder and is unable to hear
the question. And there is always the possibility that a patient may not
want to respond. For all these reasons, a nonresponse has to be consid-
ered as indeterminate.136
Nonetheless, a positive response to a volitional task is highly meaning-
ful. In neuroimaging circles, this is taken as demonstrating the presence
of consciousness and not mere passive activation of a region of interest in
the brain because, in a volitional task, the patient has to hear the com-
mand.137 For example, the patient is told to imagine swimming but then
must do that task in her head to activate the motor strip. This is exceed-
ingly valuable information as it indicates the presence of covert con-
sciousness. As noted previously in my book, Rights Come to Mind, in my
view, there is “[n]othing more important than knowing that a patient may
be conscious, especially when there is a paucity of motor output and the
possibility that neuroimaging data, obtained through research or not,
might suggest that an individual thought to be vegetative might actually
be aware.”138
There are other neurophysiologic findings that track with the presence
of covert consciousness. The ability to follow a volitional command indi-
133. See generally Claassen et al., supra note 66; Edlow et al., supra note 65.
134. Joseph J. Fins & Nicholas D. Schiff, In the Blink of the Mind’s Eye, 40 HASTINGS
CTR. REP. 21, 21 (2010).
135. See Joseph J. Fins, Wait, Wait . . . Don’t Tell Me: Tuning in the Injured Brain, 64
ARCHIVES NEUROLOGY 158, 158 (2012); see also Jonathan C. Bardin et al., Dissociations
Between Behavioral and Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging-Based Evaluations of
Cognitive Function After Brain Injury, 134 BRAIN 769, 774 (2011).
136. See Fins & Schiff, supra note 134, at 23.
137. See Edlow et al., supra note 65, at 2411.
138. FINS, RIGHTS COME TO MIND, supra note 24, at 201.
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cates that the patient has intact integrative neural networks.139 This physi-
ologically distinguishes MCS patients and others with CMD from
vegetative patients who lack this integrative functionality.140 This be-
comes especially important when we consider how pain is processed and
the neuro-palliative care needs of this exceedingly vulnerable patient
population.141 Steven Laureys and his colleagues demonstrated that pa-
tients in the vegetative state subjected to a noxious stimulus only acti-
vated the primary sensory area and did not activate the more widely
distributed pain network involving the cortex and associated areas.142
This contrasts with patients with intact integrative functions. But if pa-
tients in MCS with CMD are misdiagnosed as vegetative and thereby
thought to be insensate, then pain medication can be thought to be un-
necessary.143 This omission becomes all the more horrific because these
patients cannot reliably express their distress, communicate their pain, or
ask for help.144 This compounds this medical error.145
The failure to recognize covert consciousness remains a clinical chal-
lenge with ethical and legal implications. A major barrier to diagnosis is
the perception amongst clinicians that brain injuries are static and that
once a patient has had a devastating injury there is no hope for meaning-
ful recovery. While this perception has its roots in the futility presump-
tions embedded in cases like Quinlan and Cruzan, this precept is as old as
the writings of Hippocrates himself, who scribed an ancient aphorism that
all brain injuries are invariably fatal.146 While this was contested by Ga-
len, the second century Pergamum physician and undisputed master of
the Hippocratic corpus, who observed that he had seen the injured brain
139. See Joseph J. Fins & Maria G. Master, Disorders of Consciousness and Neuro-
Palliative Care: Toward an Expanded Scope of Practice for the Field, in OXFORD HAND-
BOOK OF ETHICS AT THE END OF LIFE 154, 158 (Stuart J. Younger & Robert M. Arnold
eds., 2016)
140. See id.
141. See id. at 163; see also Joseph J. Fins & Barbara Pohl, Neuro-Palliative Care and
Disorders of Consciousness, in OXFORD TEXTBOOK OF PALLIATIVE MEDICINE 285–291
(Nathan Cherny et al. eds., 5th ed. 2015); Joseph J. Fins, Neuroethics and Disorders of
Consciousness: A Pragmatic Approach to Neuropalliative Care, in THE NEUROLOGY OF
CONSCIOUSNESS, COGNITIVE NEUROSCIENCE AND NEUROPATHOLOGY 234, 240–41 (Steven
Laureys & Giulio Tononi eds., 2008).
142. See Steven Laureys et al., Central Processing of Noxious Somatosensory Stimuli in
the Persistent Vegetative State, 17 NEUROIMAGE 732, 734 (2002).
143. Camille Chatelle et al., Pain Issues in Disorders of Consciousness, 28 BRAIN IN-
JURY 1202, 1205 (2014).
144. Joseph J. Fins, When No One Notices: Disorders of Consciousness and the Chronic
Vegetative State, 44 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 14, 15 (2019).
145. See Chatelle et al., supra note 143, at 1205–06; Fins & Bernat, supra note 71, at
473; Joseph J. Fins, Brain Injury and the Civil Right We Don’t Think About, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/24/opinion/minimally-conscious-brain-
civil-rights.html?_r=0 [https://perma.cc/GZU6-E3EL] [hereinafter Fins, Brain Injury and
the Civil Right We Don’t Think About].
146. See HIPPOCRATES, APHORISMS § VI, para. 18 (Francis Adams trans., 1849) (400
B.C.E.), http://classics.mit.edu//Hippocrates/aphorisms.1.i.html [https://perma.cc/Y9X6-
JPHP].
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healed,147 the sentiments expressed by Hippocrates remain the norm and
not the exception, notwithstanding scientific progress to the contrary.
Patients who receive heroic acute care, saving lives that decades past
would have been lost, are routinely transferred to chronic care facilities
where they receive what is euphemistically described as custodial care.
Brain injuries are taken as fixed and immutable and not more properly
viewed as syndromic and subject to evolution.148 As delineated in the
Mohonk Report to the Congressional Brain Injury Caucus149 and de-
scribed in my book, Rights Come to Mind,150 and elsewhere,151 patients
with disorders of consciousness are routinely segregated in chronic care
where they are unable to get adequate medical treatment or rehabilita-
tion. They struggle for these services and a proper diagnosis, which is
accurate and captures the nuances of an often subtle recovery process.
V. FROM A RIGHT TO DIE TO A RIGHT TO CARE:
IDEOLOGY, DISABILITY LAW, AND DISORDERS OF
CONSCIOUSNESS
While there remain formidable clinical and operational barriers to the
diagnosis and treatment of patients with disorders of consciousness, the
greatest challenge is one of ideology. This transcends science and reflects
a deep cultural divide in society. Patients in the vegetative state, and
more generally those with disorders of consciousness, have been thrust
into the debate over the right to die.
The appropriation of these patients as proxies in a culture war pitting a
pro-life position against one that is pro-choice occurs at the expense of
this very vulnerable cohort. In his Cruzan dissent, Justice Brennan, argu-
ing for the rights of families to make decisions on behalf of their loved
ones, noted how these patients become victims.152 Citing the New Jersey
Supreme Court and the primacy of the family, Justice Brennan stated, “It
is . . . [the families] who treat the patient as a person, rather than as a
symbol of a cause.”153
This was particularly salient in the debate over Terri Schiavo, whose
diagnosis became an object of contention in Florida and then national
147. See SUSAN P. MATTERN, GALEN AND THE RHETORIC OF HEALING 174, 200 (2008);
see also Zoe M. Adams & Joseph J. Fins, Penfield’s Ceiling: Seeing Brain Injury Through
Galen’s Eyes, 89 NEUROLOGY 854, 856 (2017).
148. Joseph J. Fins & Nicholas D. Schiff, Differences that Make a Difference in Disor-
ders of Consciousness, 8 AM. J. BIOETHICS NEUROSCIENCE 131, 131 (2017).
149. JEAN BÉRUBÉ ET AL., THE MOHONK REPORT: A REPORT TO CONGRESS IMPROV-
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politics.154 Regrettably, the assessment of these patients has become a
litmus test of one’s political predilections and not an exercise in clinical
discernment. In an article entitled Neurological Diagnosis is More than a
State of Mind: Diagnostic Clarity and Impaired Consciousness, which I co-
authored with Plum in 2003, I noted that, “[w]hile a diverse society can
ascribe differing meaning to life in a permanent vegetative state, these
valuations should [not] undermine an accurate diagnosis . . . .”155
Sadly, the implications of a vegetative diagnosis have distorted the di-
agnostic process itself. To be seen as vegetative is to be seen as undeserv-
ing of medical care and even unworthy of one’s legal rights. To counter
this, for example, advocates for Terri Schiavo sought to assert that she
was not vegetative but, in fact, minimally conscious by means of a highly
edited video of Ms. Schiavo from her nursing home that appeared to indi-
cate that the random eye movements seen in the wakeful unresponsive
state were purposeful.156 The rationale for these diagnostic excursions
was that if she could be demonstrated as conscious, Ms. Schiavo’s life
would be more valued and more worthy of protection. Such was the argu-
ment of House and Senate legislators with medical degrees, among them
Senate Majority Leader Bill Frist, a cardiothoracic surgeon experienced
in transplant medicine and certainly skilled in these clinical
distinctions.157
Shortly after Ms. Schiavo died and her autopsy results were released, I
commented on NPR about this mix of diagnostics and politics noting,
“We all should be cautious about talking about patients we’ve never ex-
amined, and diagnosis by long distance is problematic. And I think that
the doctors in Congress who were making diagnosis were dealing with the
body politic and not with a particular patient.”158
Regrettably, some of this ideological posturing has its roots in the opin-
ions proffered in Cruzan and in the discourse of that era.159 Death and
dying were in the news and at the core of the culture of life debate.160
Proponents on both sides of the question were prone to excess as society
154. See Fins, Affirming the Right to Care, Preserving the Right to Die, supra note 21, at
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tors-with-medical-degrees-offer-opinions-on-schiavo-case.html [https://perma.cc/6HKS-
R775].
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12:00 AM), https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4705007 [https://
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mortality, 23 GENERATIONS 81, 82–83 (1999).
160. The culture war over death and dying, which began in the 1990s with Cruzan,
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tried to reign in the promise and peril of advancing medical technology.
Complex issues were reduced to questions of choice or human dignity,
often missing the nuance of what the philosopher and bioethicist Daniel
Callahan aptly called the troubled middle in between these dichotomous
perspectives.161
It was in this ideological cauldron that Cruzan was decided, contribut-
ing in part to the rhetorical excess of that period. A case in point is Justice
Stevens’s Cruzan dissent. While I agree with his opinion in large part, and
fully endorse the right of family members to make decisions on behalf of
their loved ones, I was taken aback by how he justified his point. Perhaps
in his zest to assert an argument for dominion over life’s end, Justice Ste-
vens asks the provocative question of what sort of life Ms. Cruzan was
living, if she was living at all.162 He then asked whether if she was not
living in the way that other citizens do, should she be entitled to the same
rights enjoyed by the rest of us?163 Justice Stevens wrote:
But for patients like Nancy Cruzan who have no consciousness and
no chance of recovery, there is a serious question as to whether the
mere persistence of their bodies is “life” as that word is commonly
understood, or as it is used in both the Constitution and the Declara-
tion of Independence.164
While this line of argument—denying rights to a vulnerable class—is
constitutionally chilling, Justice Stevens’s argument is not out of line with
that of the Cruzan family, who clearly loved their daughter. Her family
chose three dates for Ms. Cruzan’s tombstome: when she was “born,”
when she “departed,” and when she was “at peace.”165 The date of her
departure was the night of her accident. She was at peace when she died,
but in their view she had departed nearly eight years earlier.166 The fam-
ily, which has also marked the tombstone with “most loved, daughter-
sister-aunt,”167 felt that she had left them when she became vegetative.
Nonetheless, in asserting a right to die and arguing that “Missouri as-
serts an interest in Nancy Cruzan’s life in opposition to Nancy Cruzan’s
own interests,”168 Justice Stevens argued that Ms. Cruzan was not alive as
we understand the word “alive” to mean.169 He explained, “Life, particu-
stage in 2005. See Fins, Affirming the Right to Care, Preserving the Right to Die, supra note
21, at 170.
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REP. 52, 52–53 (1992).
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larly human life, is not commonly thought of as a merely physiological
condition or function. Its sanctity is often thought to derive from the im-
possibility of any such reduction.”170 He concluded, “[T]he idea of life is
not conceived separately from the idea of a living person.”171
Paradoxically, in making this heart-felt defense of Ms. Cruzan’s inter-
ests, Justice Stevens seems to have abridged other of Ms. Cruzan’s funda-
mental rights enumerated in the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution. His dissent seems to say that the rights enjoyed by all citi-
zens did not apply to Ms. Cruzan because she had either ceased to live in
the conventional sense or her diminished life had ceased to make a claim
on these rights.172 Indeed, in an effort to secure a right to refuse un-
wanted and disproportionate treatment, Justice Stevens actually seems to
strip Ms. Cruzan of the rights of citizenship, implying that her life, as he
understood it, did not comport with the protections and liberty interests
espoused in our nation’s foundational documents.
Justice Stevens’s argumentation, however, is internally inconsistent. To
narrowly refute the Court’s decision to uphold the Missouri ruling, he
made a broader claim about the constitutional rights of the incompetent
which would seem to contradict his earlier argument that negated those
rights when he questioned whether the “mere persistence of their bodies
is ‘life’ as that word is commonly understood, or as it is used in both the
Constitution and the Declaration of Independence.”173 As he reached his
summation he asserted, “the Court’s deference [to Missouri] seems ulti-
mately to derive from the premise that chronically incompetent persons
have no constitutionally cognizable interests at all, and so are not persons
within the meaning of the Constitution. Deference of this sort is patently
unconstitutional.”174
I would concur but the damage had already been done to the standing
of the chronically incompetent by the assertion that patients in the vege-
tative state were not alive consistent with the self-evident Jeffersonian
truths about the unalienable rights of equality, life, liberty, and the pur-
suit of happiness. That is, by struggling to assert a right of self-determina-
tion against the categorical approach of Missouri and the Court, Justice
Stevens went too far and paradoxically diminished more essential dimen-
sions of citizenship. It is true that the provision of treatment as desired by
Missouri and upheld by the Court would violate Ms. Cruzan’s liberty in-
terests. But did that assertion come at the cost of a greater degradation—
a more global assault—on her rights and those of people like her?
If we contextualize Justice Stevens’s argument against the medical facts
and take it to its logical conclusion, his comments about “‘life’ as that
word is commonly understood, or as it is used in both the Constitution
170. Id.
171. Id. at 347.
172. See id. at 345.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 354.
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and the Declaration of Independence”175 becomes especially troubling.
If, as noted previously, 41% of patients with traumatic brain injuries
thought to be vegetative in chronic care facilities are in fact minimally
conscious,176 what of their lives and their inner lives? What of patients
who have covert consciousness or CMD whose lives can be diminished
because of a failure to identify what might not be readily apparent?177
What of their rights short of a search for what we have described as these
hidden minds?178
A more salubrious and constitutionally sound approach is advanced by
Justice Brennan in his dissent. He properly asserted Ms. Cruzan’s consti-
tutional rights and asked how they could best be applied in context. He
wrote, “Nor does the fact that Nancy Cruzan is now incompetent deprive
her of her fundamental rights. . . . [T]he question is not whether an in-
competent has constitutional rights, but how such rights may be exer-
cised.”179 And herein lies the essential question: how do we exercise
rights for these patients that seem fundamentally at odds with each other
and which cross the ideological boundaries of the culture wars?
During the debate over Ms. Schiavo, while strongly advocating for the
right of her husband to make decisions on her behalf as her legal surro-
gate and based on Ms. Schiavo’s previously articulated preferences, I also
argued that we as a society needed to do more.180 We needed to both
“preserve the right to die . . . and affirm[ ] the right to care” for those who
sought those interventions.181 I believed then, and now, that this was truly
the “choice” position, nesting authority to make care decisions with fami-
lies, properly informed about the burdens and benefits of treatment and
their likelihood for success.
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In the context of patients who were permanently vegetative, as was Ms.
Schiavo following severe anoxic brain injury and cardiac arrest, the pros-
pects for recovery are essentially nil, as Ms. Schiavo’s subsequent autopsy
attested.182 For patients with anoxic injury in the vegetative state, assert-
ing a right to care is essentially arguing for ongoing nursing care and the
provision of artificial nutrition and hydration. But advocacy for patients
with traumatic brain injury who have a more favorable prognosis and all
those who have been misdiagnosed or have covert consciousness or cog-
nitive CMD may result in meaningful recovery and, notably, the identifi-
cation of individuals who may be able to reconnect with their families and
their communities.
Returning to the lineage of the right to die, epitomized by the rhetoric
of Justice Stevens’s dissent, is the irony that in establishing “one set of
rights we have trampled on the rights of others.”183 As I have written
previously:
In establishing the right to die . . . we have marginalised conscious
individuals and deprived them of their right to a self. They have been
segregated from the medical mainstream, deprived of adequate reha-
bilitation, all with the consequence that we have kept them from be-
ing more fully reintegrated into civic community. By not adequately
identifying consciousness when it exists and failing to foster it when
it does, we have perpetuated a kind of neuronal segregation.184
Elsewhere, I have argued that by denying patients with disorders of
consciousness proper diagnosis, treatment, and rehabilitation, we are pre-
cluding their maximal integration back into their families and their com-
munities. I have maintained that this amounts to segregation and, as such,
we are in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)185 and
the U.N. Convention on the Treatment of Persons with Disabilities.186
While asserting segregation may seem to be a stretch, in upholding the
ADA in Olmstead vs. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, Justice Ginsburg, writing for
the Court, called for overcoming this segregation, noting, “Congress ex-
plicitly identified unjustified ‘segregation’ of persons with disability as a
‘for[m] of discrimination.’”187 Nonetheless, many patients with disorders
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of consciousness, who are segregated from the medical mainstream, im-
properly diagnosed, and neglected, do not even fulfill the separate but
equal mandate ensconced in Plessy v. Ferguson.188
It may seem hyperbolic to view this as segregation but the exclusion
and neglect of patients with disorders of consciousness is tragically sys-
tematic. It is rooted in biases that have their origins in the virtuous pur-
suit of a right to die, of self-determination. But in reviewing this record,
we can see there have been unintended consequences of this march to
progress for conscious beings who are wholly dependent upon others and
vulnerable. Neuroscience now has the ability to identify them and give
them voice through neuroprosthetics, drugs, neuromodulation, and reha-
bilitation. I have asserted that this should be the civil rights mandate of
our era.189
Overcoming segregation for these patients is not merely a question of
physical reintegration into their communities. Rather, through the identi-
fication of consciousness when it exists and the provision of the means to
foster and restore communication, we can help to overcome the barriers
erected by injury and society and reintegrate individuals back into the
nexus of their families and communities.
Communication is the critical issue, if we consider how we appreciate
the consciousness of others.190 It is well appreciated that the only con-
sciousness we can know is our own. Given this, the only way to infer the
consciousness of others is through the restoration of functional communi-
cation. This is how we know the other is there. Note the cognates: com-
munity and communication. Reintegration, and the overcoming of the
segregation of these individuals into civil society, is achieved through af-
firming their right to care and restoring functional communication. These
efforts begin with eschewing ideological vestiges of the right-to-die move-
ment and corrosive rhetoric that diminishes this possibility.
Neuroscience has provided us with the ability to identify patients, once
thought vegetative, who are indeed conscious. And now that we have the
means to appreciate that these people exist, we are morally obliged not to
look away. We now can appreciate that the neglect, marginalization, and
segregation suffered by these individuals is unjustifiable and wrong. In
the majority opinion in Obergefell v. Hodges, which decriminalized gay
marriage, Justice Kennedy aptly wrote, “[N]ew insights and societal un-
derstanding can reveal unjustified inequality within fundamental institu-
tions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.”191 What was true in
that landmark civil rights case will, I hope, someday be written by an-
other court for patients with disorders of consciousness whose prospects
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